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Karl Mannheim' s Contributions to the 
Development of the Sociology of 
Knowledge Peter Mayo 
arl Mannheim's work in the area of 
Sociology of Knowledge is generally 
considered to be his greatest 
contribution to sociological research. 
In his writings on the subject, the 
Hungarian theorist posits that a sociology of 
knowledge is possible and that there exists a 
relationship between forms of knowledge and social 
structure. His major contention in this respect is that 
ideas relating to definitions of social reality are 
existentially-determined. 
In this paper, I shall attempt to provide an 
exposition of Mannheim's ideas regarding the 
existential determination of knowledge, taking into 
account: 
(a) the various schools of thought and social factors 
which influenced his thinking; 
(b) his interpretation of the concepts of ideology 
and utopia; 
(c) the way he soughtto grapple with such pertinent 
issues as the validity or otherwise of existentially-
determined knowledge; 
(d) his attempts at preventing his theory from 
lapsing into relativistic nihilism, and finally, 
(e) the various criticisms levelled at his work on the 
Sociology of Knowledge. 
The Social Setting and the various 
philosophical influences 
annheim was active as a writer 
exploring the relationship between 
knowledge and existence at a time 
during which Central Europe was still 
reeling from the effects of the First 
World War. The 'Front Generation' of the First 
World War was shocked not so much by the violence 
and the human as well as economic losses as by the 
fact that 'reality' had revealed itself in a different and 
terrible light (Kecskemeti, 1968: 2): 
"What everyone had taken to be reality itself 
now stood revealed as an illusion. A complete re-
orientation was felt to be necessary; a re-examination 
of all traditional ideas about reality, all values, all 
principles ... one no longer lived in the shameful 
situation of taking the unreal for the real, of trusting 
illusory authorities and values." 
(Kecskemeti, 1968 : 2) 
The overriding concern appeared to be that of 
shattering the illusion. Traditional ideas had to be re-
examined. Similar concerns appear in Mannheim' s 
work on the Sociology of Knowledge as well as in his 
other writings related to the subject. Mannheim's 
work deals with such issues as the relativism of truth 
-an issue widely discussed in Germany at the turn of 
the century. In this respect, his work stood in 
marked contrast to that of the Phenomenological 
School which had come to be identified with the 
theory of absolute,objective as opposed to relative, 
subjective values (Kecskemeti, 1968:8). 
Max Scheler was the chief proponent of the 
objectivist theory of value and yet, quite surprisingly, 
he later became arguably the first social theorist to 
employ the term 'sociology of knowledge' 
(Kecskemeti, 1968:8), using it in the wake of a 
strategic campaign against Positivism, in which he 
wanted to show that, despite its pre-eminence, 
science is not a superior form of knowledge, having 
greater validity than, say, religion or metaphysics 
(Kecskemeti, 1968:16). According to Scheler, it is 
only given greater importance in bourgeois, capitalist 
societies, societies dedicated to the control and 
manipulation of things, whereas those which 
promote other values would, according to Scheler, 
generate other types of knowledge (Kecskemeti, 
1968:16, 17). 
Mannheim regarded Scheler as a 'Conservative' 
thinker who, nevertheless, acknowledged that the 
mind depended on material factors (Kecskemeti, 
1968: 17). Unlike the Positivists, whom Scheler 
attacked, Mannheim maintained, in the essay 'On 
Interpretation of Weltanschauung' (1923), that 
methodologies used in the natural sciences could 
not be applied in relation to the social sciences and 
other cultural objects(Larrain, 1979: 101). He argues 
that, when analysing social life, a specific kind of 
understanding ('verstehen') is required, "since the 
object of knowledge partly involves the subject" 
(Larrain, 1979:100). InMannheim'sview, therefore, 
a distinction between 'Geisteswissenchaften' and 
'Naturwissenchaften' is made. This is very much in 
keeping with the Historicist tradition which 
Mannheimobserves(Larrain, 1979:103). Mannheim 
appears to go as far as to intimate that natural 
sciences should be excluded from "the direct 
determination of social factors" (Larrain, 1979:1 03). 
On the other hand, knowledge and ideas that are 
existentially-determined, and these include historical, 
political and cultural matters (Larrain, 1979: 103), 
are "bound to a location", albeit differently , within 
the social set up and historical process (Coser, 
1977:431). 
Mannheim states that cultural objects and 
phenomena can be dealt with in two ways: they may 
be understood either from the inside, so that their 
immanent meanings may be revealed, or from the 
outside, that is to say, they may be viewed as a 
reflection of the social process in which their producer 
is involved, the latter being the method of the 
Sociology of Knowledge (Coser, 1977:430). 
Mannheim's view, therefore, is "that all thoughts in 
the humanities and social sciences are determined 
in form and content by non-theoretical factors 
"(Remmling, 1975:9). 
This is very much in accordance with the tenets 
of Historicism which incorporated historical 
relativism and stressed that "each thought and each 
human action could only be understood and 
judged in terms of its cultural matrix" (Coser, 
1977:452). 1 
The influence of Marxian thought is too obvious 
to pass unobserved. The notion of the social 
conditioning or social determination of thought was 
expressed by Marx in such early works as The 
German Ideology, wherein he stated that the 
dominant ideas in every epoch are the ideas of the 
dominant class (Tucker, 1978:172). As Remmling 
(197 5) maintains, "it was Marx who first interpreted 
ideas as mere reflections of their producer's position 
in the 'process of production', of his class position" 
(p.56). 
Both Marx and the exponents of Historicism 
sought to establish a strong relationship between 
ideas and the social structures within which the 
producers of such ideas are located. In this respect, 
the issue of relativism becomes relevant to any 
consideration of their discussion of the relationship 
between knowledge and society. As already 
indicated, the same applies to any discussion of 
Mannheim's work on the Sociology of Knowledge. 
Mannheim asserted that thought was "group 
thought" in that it is rooted in "group 
action":(Ditterberner,1979:13):" ... knowledge is 
from the very beginning a cooperative effort of 
group life, in which everyone unfolds his knowledge 
within the framework of a common fate, a common 
activity, and the overcoming of common difficulties 
(in which, however, each has a different share)." 
(Mannheim,1936:29). 
For Mannheim, ideas are very much related to 
the 'group' to which their proponent belongs.2 In 
this respect, one cannot overlook Marx's notion 
that ideas are relative to the social class of those 
who espouse them. For Marx, therefore, class was 
the main determinant of knowledge. For Mannheim, 
however, the range of 'groups' that determined 
knowledge was much broader, including not only 
social class but also status groups, occupational 
categories and (Coser, 1977:433) age groups. The 
last mentioned were accorded great importance by 
Mannheim.3 
The Concept of Ideology 
ne aspect of Mannheim's work which 
inevitably invited comparisons with 
that of Karl Marx is his treatment of 
the concept of ideology. In Marxian 
theory, the concept assumes great 
importance and refers to "a class rationale of 
suppposedly universal ideas that actually masked 
class interests" (Ditterberner, 1979: 1). It is widely 
used in Marx's work as "illusion, 'false 
consciousness"' (Ditterberner, 1979: 1), or, as 
Raymond Williams puts it, 'an upside down version 
of reality'. 
Mannheim, for his part, distinguishes between 
what he calls a 'particular' and a 'total' conception 
of ideology. The former refers "only to specific 
assertions which may be regarded as concealments, 
falsifications or lies without attacking the integrity of 
the total mental structure of the asserting subject" 
(Mannheim, 1936:266). As such, the particular 
conception of ideology was limited only to the 
content of an opponent's assertion and indicates 
that only part of his/her argument is "ideological", 
while the total conception of ideology calls into 
question the entire 'Weltanschauung' (world view) 
of an adversary(Ditterberner, 1979:15, 16). It refers 
"to a phenomenon revealing concern 'with the 
characteristics and composition of the total structure 
of the mind' of an age or social group" (Larrain, 
1979: 108). The total conception operates at a 
sociological level, whereas the particular conception 
operates at a psychological level, the total conception 
of ideology presupposing that there is a 
correspondence between a particular standpoint or 
perspective and a given social location (Ditterberner, 
1979: 16). Ditterberner (1979) considers 
Mannheim's notion of the total conception of 
ideology to be akin to Marx's notion of false 
consciousness, however with a difference (p.16). In 
Marxian theory, Ideological and, hence, 'false' 
thinking was the characteristic of non-Marxists (p.· 
12). Marxists held their ideas to be true and non-
ideological in as much as they served as an expression 
of a class without any privileged interests to safeguard 
(Coser, 1977:431). Mannheimpositedthatallideas 
were ideological, including those expressed by Marx. 
Ideological thought was the characteristic of everyone 
(Ditterberner 1979:12). Therefore, Mannheim's 
notion of the total concept of ideology "was purged 
of Marx's notion of truth and therefore without the 
invidious note associated with false consciousness" 
(Ditterbemer, 1979: 16). Unlike the particular 
conception of ideology, which is associated with 
"falsity" (Mannheim, 1936:265), the total 
conception is devoid of all "moral and denunciatory 
intent" (Mannheim, 1936:266). Absolute truth and 
falsification are values that do not apply to 
Mannheim's total conception of ideology. 
Therefore, because of its moral connotation, 
the term "ideology" is finally dropped by Mannheim 
and substituted by the term "the Sociology of 
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Knowledge" which he regards as "a research interest 
which leads to the raising of the question when and 
where social structures come to express themselves 
in the structure of assertions, and in what sense the 
former concretely determine the latter" (Mannheim, 
1936:266). 
Since social structures determine the structure 
of assertions, then thought inevitably comes to be 
regarded as perspectivistic. The same object is 
viewed differently by different persons, depending 
on their place in historical time and social 
structure:(Coser, 1977 :431): 
"Perspective .... is something more than a 
merely formal determination of thinking. It 
refers also to qualitative elements in the structure 
of thought, elements which must necessarily be 
overlooked by a purely formal logic. It is precisely 
these factors which are responsible for the fact 
that two persons, even if they apply the same 
formal-logical rules, eg. the law of contradiction 
or the formula of the syllogism, in an identical 
manner, may judge the same object very 
differently." (Mannheim, 1936:272) 
As such, "Human thought is 'situationally 
relative'" (Coser, 1977:432). Inevitably, this exposed 
Mannheim to a flood of criticism on the grounds that 
his theory degenerated into relativistic nihilism. He·· 
himself is on record as having concluded, at one 
stage, that since all thought is 'ideological' in nature, 
then "all thinking is false" (cf. Otto Dahlke 's criticism 
in Contemporary Social Theory, referred to in 
Kecskemeti 1968:28). 
Mannheim sought to escape such criticism in 
various ways. In Ideology and Utopia, he states that 
perspectivistic thought is not necessarily invalid but 
"might merely represent a partial view" (Mannheim, 
1936:284). After all, he had stated that, at times, 
particular groups can have greater means of 
understanding a social phenomenon than other 
groups but no group can have complete means 
( Coser, 1977:431). Partial truth remains a possibility 
in a situation where thought is perspectivistic. 
However, the attainment of absolute truth remains 
out of the question. 
Mannheim calls this version of his theory 
"relationism", the term he employed in order to 
counter that of "relativism" which "denies the validity 
of any standards and of the existence of order in this 
world" (Mannheim, 1936:283). Mannheim(1936) 
insists that the "analyses characteristic of the 
Sociology of Knowledge are by no means irrelevant" 
for the determination of truth(p285). As 
Larrain(1979) indicates, he asserts that sociological 
interpretation does not merely posit a relationship 
between the cultural object and the social 
world(P.107) but represents an attempt to 
"particularize its scope and the extent of its validity" 
(Mannheim, 1936:284). By virtue of 
particularization, "relationism 'restricts' the claim to 
truth.", limiting the extent to which knowledge is 
valid (Larrain, 1979:107). 
Mannheim took great pains to steer clear of 
relativism. He asserts that Relationism "signifies 
merely that all the elements of meaning in a given 
situation have reference to one another and derive 
their significance from this reciprocal 
interrelationship in a given frame of thought" 
(Mannheim, 1936:86). 
Mannheim maintains that the 'dynamic 
relationism' he advocates is the only means whereby 
one can synthesize the multiplicity of competing 
ideologies, each one of which is existentially 
determined(Ditterbemer, 1979: 18). In 'Competition 
as a Cultural Phenomenon', Mannheim maintains 
that synthesis can emerge from a situation of 
polarisation (Kecskemeti, 1968:25). Competing 
viewpoints would be assimilated until a relatively 
total conception of reality would emerge 
(Ditterbemer, 1979: 18). Mannheim claims that the 
Sociology of Knowledge can lead to such a synthesis. 
Kettler, Meja and Stehr (1984), point out that, 
in Mannheim's view, "enquiry into social genesis 
will, if comprehensively done, bring about a synthesis 
of valid elements in the ideologies, relocating them 
in a development context which will not so much 
falsify the ideologies as cognitive structures as render 
them obsolete - displaced by a new comprehensive 
vision" (p.61). 
The people who, in Mannheim's view, are 
ideally situated to carry out this 'synthesis' are those 
who belong to the "classless stratum" of the 'free-
floating' or 'socially unattached intelligentsia' 
(freishwebende intelligenz), the term he borrowed 
from Alfred Weber. Mannheim believed that 
'unattached' intellectuals had two options available 
to them to get out of their classless situation. They 
could either choose to become what Gramsci would 
term 'organic intellectuals', in that they would attach 
themselves to a particular class, or else they could 
engage in "scrutiny of their own social 
moorings"(Mannheim, 1936: 158). Mannheim 
believed that, if they chose the latter path, they 
would arrive at a new consciousness, one which 
would allow them to discover that they are in a 
position from where a total perspective can be 
attained (Ditterbemer, 1979:18, 19). 
Mannheim believed that such a choice is possible 
in that, although these intellectuals do have class 
links and hail from most diverse social backgrounds, 
these differences become subordinate to that 
particular factor which brings them together -
education (Larrain,1979:116): 
"It is . . . peculiarly characteristic of this new 
basis of association that it preserves the multiplicity 
of the component elements in all their variety by 
creating a homogeneous medium within which the 
conflicting parties can measure their strength ... 
This acquired educational heritage subjects him (the 
Educated Man) to the opposing tendencies in social 
reality ... " (Mannheim, 1936: 155, 156). It is from 
this position that the educated person, the 'free-
floating' intellectual, can engage in the sort of 
'syntheses' that could lead to a total conception of 
reality. 4 And the Sociology of Knowledge was 
considered by Mannhein to be of crucial importance 
to the intellectuals in carrying out this task, (Kettler 
eta!, 1984:6). Mannheim's belief in a 'vanguard' of 
intellectuals was reaffirmed in his later, British writings 
on the Sociology of Planned Reconstruction. There 
he wrote in terms of a chosen scientific elite of social 
planners, moral leaders and sociologists with a new 
orientation(Coser, 1977 :440). As far as his writings 
on the Sociology of Knowledge go, the hopes which 
Mannheim pinned on a classless stratum of 
intellectuals left him open to a barrage of criticism. 
Most of his critics considered his attempts to avoid 
lapsing into nihilistic relativism as unconvincing and 
hardly successfui(Coser, 1977:436). 
Mannheim tried other means of grappling with 
the problem of validity. The notions of 'pragmatic 
adjustment' and what he calls 'the quest for reality' 
constituted such means. It would be amiss to explain 
such notions without referring to the distinction 
which Mannheim draws between ideological and 
utopian thought. In Mannheim' s view, both ideology 
and utopia distort reality in as much as the ideas 
which they comprise are not conguent with it. The 
former is viewed by Mannheim as a kind of distortion 
which fails to take into account the new realities 
characterising a situation(Larrain,1979: 114). 
Ideas relating to past realities which, 
nevertheless, enable their proponents to retain their 
privileges (e.g. Conservatism) may be considered as 
ideological. The utopian distortion, on the other 
hand, transcends existing reality and is projected 
'beyond the present'(Larrain,1979: 113).5 So 
Mannheim argues that both types of thought are 
inadequate and situationally incongruous, since, in 
his view, ideology conceals reality while utopia 
exceeds its limits (Larrain, 1979: 114). 
The avoidance of these distortions should, 
according to Mannheim, be conducive to a "quest 
for reality"(Larrain, 1979: 14). He states that 
"thought should contain neither less nor more than 
the reality in whose medium it operates" (Mannheim, 
cited in Larrain, 1979: 114). This is very much in 
keeping with the principle that "every idea must be 
tested by its congruence with reality" (Mannheim, 
cited in Ditterberner, 1979: 17). The implication of 
this statement is that such thought would have a 
measure of validity in that it would be free from the 
kind of "distortion" referred to above. 
Critique of Mannheim' s Sociology of 
Knowledge 
he criticism levelled at Mannheim' s 
proposition and formulation of the 
relationship between knowledge and 
existence has been widespread and 
varied. Robert K. Merton, who 
attempted something very much on the lines of a 
sociology of knowledge, in his study on 'Puritanism, 
Pietism and Science'(Ditterberner, 1979:35), 
criticizes Mannheim on the grounds that too many 
kinds of thoughts are grouped together by Mannheim 
under the same category of the Sociology of 
Knowledge, stating that the same considerations 
are applied to "ethical, aesthetic, political, religious 
an scientific judgements" (Ditterberner, 1979: 36). 
Speier alludes to virtually the same thing when he 
states that the considerations which Mannheim 
makes apply to the thought of men of action but 
could not be applied to philosophical thought which, 
he argues, could not be understood only in social 
terms(Ditteberner, 1979: 32). 
Some critics (e.g. Speier) argue that there is 
also an inconsistency in the use of the term 'ideology'. 
In his distinction between ideology and utopia, 
Mannheim refers to the former as a situationally 
inadequate thought. Elsewhere, he refers to all 
existentially-determined thinking as ideology 
(Ditterberner, 1979: 32). Another inconsistency 
concerns the issue of validity. At one stage, 
Mannheim asserts that "all thinking is false" whereas, 
elsewhere, in a bid to confound his critics who 
accused him of veering towards nihilistic relativism, 
Mannheim provides a modified version of this 
statement by positing something to the effect the 
since thought is perspectivistic it can have partial 
validity. Merton (1957) also refers to a fundamental 
indecision on Mannheim's part regarding 
specification of "the type or mode of relations 
betweensocialstructureandknowledge" (p.498). In 
the relevant chapter in Merton's book, a number of 
terms, pointing to the nature of the relationship 
between thought and social structure, are listed. 
Such inconsistencies and indecisions are indeed 
glaring. Nevertheless, they can be excused on the 
grounds that Mannheim was merely proposing an 
area of sociological enquiry, one whose theories 
were in constant need of reformulation. His work in 
this field is therefore characterised by its "groping 
and tentative nature" (Coser, 1977: 430). 
Mannheim has often been criticised on the 
grounds that his work is self-contradictory. As Otto 
Dahlke maintains: 
"The notion of relativism or relationism, as 
developed by Mannheim, is self-contradictory, 
for it must presuppose its own absoluteness. The 
sociology of knowledge must assume its own 
validity; if it has to have any meaning." 
(Cited in Kecskemeti, 1968: 28) 
He seems to have been re-echoing V on Shelting 
who stated that "the traditional concept of truth was 
both implied and denied- implied for Mannheim's 
own thought, denied to others"(Ditterberner, 
1979:22). 
"Since a la Mannheim, the total structure of 
consciousness is included in the ideology concept, 
and since, consequently, there cannot be any 
thinking but ideological thinking, therefore even 
scientific thought, and especially in the social 
sciences, falls under this concept and becomes 
"functionalized" with respect to social f~ctors. 
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Consequently, according to our author, its 
objective, impartial validity is destroyed." 
(Von Schelting, cited in Ditterberner, 1979: 22) 
This appears to be the consequence of the 
formulation of a theory with strong relativistic 
overtones. After all, Mannheim himself 
acknowledged that all thinking is ideological, including 
his own. As such, he seems to be undermining his 
theory's validity. Going by Mannheim' sown criteria, 
the truth expressed in his theory can only be partially 
valid, unless he saw himself as one of those 'free 
floating' intellectuals aspiring to develop a total 
conception of reality. 
The concept of the 'socially-unattached 
intelligentsia' may indeed have been the product of 
his own existential-situation as a young intellectual 
in his native Hungary. Judging from the literature it 
appears that the existence of a socially unattached 
stratum of intellectuals was indeed possible in this 
country during and after the First World War. Coser 
(1977) writes that he belonged to an "increasingly 
self-conscious group of Budapest intellectuals", a 
high proportion of whom were of Jewish origin, just 
like Mannheim(P .441). Coser (197 7) states that like 
the Russian intelligentsia of the previous century, 
these Jewish intellectuals were "largely men without 
firm attachment to any of the major strata and 
classes of their society. They were conscious of their 
isolation and unhappily or proudly aware of their 
marginality" (Coser, 1987:442). 
Even so, the present writer finds it hard to 
believe that a similar strata of intellectuals can be 
found in academic circles in Western society today. 
There is ample literature in the Sociology of Education 
to show that the formal system of education in 
Western capitalist society tends to favour the middle 
class. As such, the majority of academics and 
intellectuals, who normally feature prominently 
among the beneficiaries of the school system, are 
likely to hail from the middle-class. This may serve 
to repudiate Mannheim' s argument that intellectuals 
are likely to emerge from diverse social backgrounds 
as a result of which an academic in an educational 
establishment is likely to be exposed to different 
perspectives. One ought to remark that when 
Mannheim formulated this theory of the Intelligentsia, 
German universities were full of intellectuals who 
were openly attached to particular social classes and 
their political interests(Remmling,1975:71). The 
majority embraced views which were an amalgam of 
"reactionary conservatism and nationalism" 
(Remmling, 1975:71). 
Furthermore, as Larrain (1979) remarks, the 
theory of the social determination of knowledge 
appears to be "incompatible" with that of the socially 
unattached intelligentsia(P.116). It appears 
incongruous that the producers of that very same 
knowledge which is existentially-determined should 
be socially unattached: "The fact that all existentially 
determined thought is relativized to a social situation 
is inconsistent with the lack of attachment of its 
authors" (Larrain, 1979: 116). 
Furthermore, Mannheim's belief in the ability 
of an 'elite' of socially unattached intellectuals to 
arrive at a total conception of reality has implications 
for a theory concerning the manner in which 
knowledge is to be disseminated. Judging from 
Mannheim' s views, knowledge is to be disseminated 
in a most traditional manner- from above. It may be 
existentially-determined but it is not likely to emerge 
from the educatee's cultural base. That kind of 
knowledge can only be partial, perspectivistic. 
Knowledge relating to a total conception of reality 
can only be derived from above, that is from a 
vanguard of 'socially-unattached' intellectuals. 
The other means through which Mannheim 
sought to come to terms with the problem of truth 
was provided by the notion of the quest for reality: 
"thought should contain neither less nor more than 
the reality in whose medium it operates" (Mannheim, 
eited in Larrain, 1979: 114). One feels inclined to 
ask whether Mannheim regards 'reality' as a social-
construct. Judging from Mannheim's own assertion 
that thought is existentially-determined, one expects 
reality to be viewed differently by different people 
(Larrain, 1979:114). 
The same applies to the notion of adjustment 
contained in the related statement that "A theory ... 
is wrong if in a practical situation it uses concepts 
and categories which, if taken seriously, would 
prevent man from adjusting himself at that historical 
stage" (Merton, 1957:503). Thisiswhatisgenerally 
referred to as the theory of pragmatic adjustment. 
As Robert K. Merton (1957) points out, social 
adjustment is "a normative rather than an existential 
concept" (p.503). And, needless to say, the construct 
to which the individual is expected to adjust is reality 
which, in itself, constitutes no criterion for establishing 
truth. Furthermore, as Coser (1977) points out, 
judgements as to which ideas contributed to 
adjustment in a given historical period are likely to 
be made ex-post facto (p.435). 
One of the criticisms levelled at Mannheim's 
work on the Sociology of Knowledge concerned his 
separation of immanent and functional meaning. 
Mannheim distinguishes between idea and ideology, 
the former referring to an intellectual proposition 
when considered from within and the other referring 
to a similar phenomenon when considered from 
without (Larrain,1979: 119). As Larrain (1979) 
argues, this contrast is conducive to an 
"epistemological dualism which separates the 
ideological from the intrinsic meaning of thought" 
(p.119). It appears as though Mannheim considers 
only functional meaning as valid, · rejecting any 
consideration of an immanent meaning and so the 
Sociology of Knowledge which he proposes appears 
incapable of criticizing the content of a theory or 
thought since it insists upon its social setting (Larrain, 
1979:120). 
A theory which serves to unmask social 
contradictions and which may be in the interests of 
those who suffer, as a result of such contradictions, 
can have both 'immanent' and 'functional' validity. 
One feels that a theory can be judged 'per se' as well 
as in relation to its social function. 
The theory of the Sociology of Knowledge is 
widely regarded as an outgrowth of 
Historicism(Coser, 1977:452), according to which 
every epoch "can only be understood in its own 
terms (Abercrombie, et a/, 1986:10). Ideas are 
therefore considered to be determined by the 
existential conditions prevalent during the historical 
period during which they are formulated. This 
appears to be a tenet of both Historicism and the 
Sociology of Knowledge. According to this theory, 
cultural products, including literary works, contain 
ideas that are relative to the historical, cultural and 
social settings in which they are produced. As such, 
judging from Mannheim's theories, they have only 
partial validity and can only be understood following 
a process of 'verstehen'. Such theories, however, 
do not explain why societies as historically remote 
from each other as Fifth Century B.C. Athens, 
Elizabethan and Jacobean England and Nineteenth 
Century Russia have managed to produce works of 
art that seem to convey identical insights into the 
human condition, despite the fact that they are the 
product of completely different cultures and were 
written in unrelated languages. Going by Mannheim' s 
theory, this could hardly have been possible, 
considering that the ideas expressed by the various 
writers were directly related to their respective age, 
culture and society. One may, perhaps, argue that 
ideas and insights that reappear across different 
times and cultures may be regarded as having 
validity.6 
Having outlined the criticisms levelled at and 
the problems related to Mannheim 's proposition of 
the Sociology of Knowledge, one may conclude this 
paper by acknowledging that Mannheim has shed 
some important light on the nature of the relationship 
between k;·1owledge and existence. His work has 
served to call into question several assumptions 
which, for years, had been formulated as absolute 
truths. Fun:hermore, building on the work of such 
predecessors as Scheler, he has indicated that 
historical, cultural and social ideas have to be judged 
by criteria which are different from those applied in 
relation to the natural sciences, stressing that such 
ideas are conditioned by the social situation of their 
proponents. In this respect, he has indicated that 
the range of sources determining such knowledge is 
more varied than Marx would have us believe. The 
chains to which men of knowledge were bound, to 
adopt Coser's metaphor(Coser, 1977 :437), include 
not only class but also age, status and occupational 
groups (in this respect, Mannheim's concept of 
social differentiation is closer to the Weberian than 
the Marxian model). 
Mannheim was active in a period rocked by 
tremendous political upheavals, the insecurity of 
which was partly reflected through such concepts as 
'nihilism' and 'relativism', the latter being so 
widespread that it even made its presence felt in 
cultural productions of the age (e.g. the plays of 
Luigi Pirandello). To his credit, Mannheim took 
great pains to steer his theory of the sociology of 
knowledge away from relativism. The fact that he 
was hardly successful in this regard should not 
detract from his merit in having identified the 
problem of truth and validity as an area of major 
concern for those who later were to attempt to 
develop the theory he helped pioneer. 
Finally, the issue of the socially unattached 
intelligentsia may have rendered him vulnerable to 
criticism. Nevertheless, given the political and social 
turmoil characterising the period in which he was 
active, including the later English years, which were 
affected by the advent of Nazism, it appears quite 
understandable that he should pin his hopes on 
intellectuals. They may have appeared to him to 
constitute the only crag of sanity in an ocean of 
madness. 
Notes 
1. Mannheim's Sociology of Knowledge can be regarded as 
having grown out of the Historicist tenet, propounded by 
such theorists as Wilhelm Dilthey and Ernst Troeltsch, that 
every epoch can only be judged in its own 
terms(Coser, 1977 :452). 
2. Mannheim asserts that such young persons provide ideas 
that are intended either to "change the surrounding world 
of nature and society" or to "maintain it in a given 
condition", depending on "the character and position of 
the groups to which they belong" (Mannheim, 1936: 4). 
The point that thought is related, in Mannheim, to the 
intention to change or maintain nature and society is 
stressed by Steven Seidman in a footnote to the introduction 
to his book, Liberalism and the Origins of European 
Social Theory (cf. Seidman, 1983:302). 
3. The essay on 'Generations' deals with this particular 
determinant of knowledge. Mannheim posits that generation 
is not a 'concrete group' in that it has neither an 
organisational framework nor a 'community 
character'(Kecskemeti, 1968:23). Nevertheless, one's 
generation does have a bearing on certain facets of one's 
behaviour and thinking. Members of the same age group 
will, however, have nothing in common, unless they belong 
to the same culture and society{Kecskemeti, 1968:23,24), 
Moreover, even within the same historical community, 
members of the same generation can be split up into clearly 
defined sub-groups with different orientations based on 
political or class lines (Kecskemeti, 1968:24). Mannheim 
calls these sub-groups 'generation units'. Knowledge may 
therefore be conditioned by an interplay of generational, 
cultural and social factors. 
4. Mannheim attached a lot of importance to Education and 
Intellectualism elsewhere in his writings, most notably 
those related to his 'British' period. He regarded Education 
(including Adult and Parent Education) and Religion as the 
cornerstone of his plan for social reconstruction(Coser, 
1977:439), They were deemed necessary for Western 
society, which was haunted by the spectre of Nazism and 
was regarded, in a manner reminiscent of T.S. Eliot (cf. 
'The Wasteland'), as being devoid of its moral fibre and in 
need of regeneration. 
5. Mannheim drew a further distincton, namely between 
absolute and relative utopias. He regarded the former as 
ones which 'in principle can never be realised' while the 
latter are those which appear to be unrealizable only from 
the standpoint of a given social order(Larrain, 1979: 113). 
30 
6. I am indebted, here, to two persons, namely Mr. Paul 
Spiteri and Prof. Anne Marie Decore. The former raised 
and developed this issue in a personal letter sent to me, 
while Prof. Decore, a teacher of mine at the University of 
Alberta, discussed it with me, maintaining that this 
observation can open an avenue towards establishing 
validity, and that ideas and insights which recur across time 
and cultures may be identical to those whose validity is 
established by 'free floating intellectuals'. 
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